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THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: FROM THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION TO THE MINIMAL
CONSTITUTION
James E. Fleming*
INTRODUCTION: MINIMALISM VERSUS PERFECTIONISM IN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Cass Sunstein and I have written fundamentally different books. My
Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy' puts forward
a liberal Constitution-perfecting theory, one that aspires to interpret the
American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be. Sunstein's
Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for
America2  advances a minimalist critique of radical conservative
constitutional theories of "fundamentalism" that call for restoring the
"Constitution in exile."
What are the justifications for pairing these two books in this series of
symposia? First, most obviously, I devote one and one-half chapters of my
book to criticizing Sunstein's constitutional theories as presented in his
earlier works. In Chapter 2, I critique his book, The Partial Constitution,3
using it as a foil to justify moving beyond John Hart Ely's process-
perfecting theory of reinforcing representative democracy4 to my own
Rawlsian Constitution-perfecting theory of securing constitutional
* Leonard F. Manning Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
I prepared this essay for the Symposium on Minimalism Versus Perfectionism in
Constitutional Theory, based on my book, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of
Autonomy, and Cass R. Sunstein's book, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing
Courts Are Wrong for America, held at Fordham University School of Law, December 8,
2006. I am grateful to Abner Greene and Ben Zipursky for organizing the Symposium, to
Cass Sunstein for writing such a thoughtful essay on my book, and to not only Abner Greene
and Ben Zipursky but also Charles Kelbley, Jae Lee, and Bill Treanor for writing insightful
essays on both of our books. I also am indebted to Sotirios Barber, Samuel Freemann, Mark
Graber, Linda McClain, and Larry Solum, along with my research assistants Lauren Cowan
and Stacey Daniel, for helpful comments.
1. James E. Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy
(2006) [hereinafter Fleming, Securing].
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong
for America (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Radicals].
3. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Partial].
4. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980)
[hereinafter Ely, Democracy and Distrust].
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democracy. Ironically, the very perfectionism of Sunstein's book made it
useful for this purpose: I interpreted it as a process-perfecting theory of
securing deliberative democracy that was superior, in certain respects, to
Ely's theory. 5 In Chapter 7, I critique Sunstein's Legal Reasoning and
Political Conflict6 and his One Case at a Time 7 in considering what form
constitutional interpretation and judicial review should take in
circumstances of moral disagreement and political conflict about basic
liberties such as the right to privacy or autonomy. I use his "minimalism,"
together with Michael Sandel's civic republicanism in Democracy's
Discontent,8 as diametrically opposed republican foils: they unwittingly
show the superiority of a liberal republican theory like mine in
circumstances of reasonable moral pluralism.9
Second, also obviously, Sunstein develops a minimalist critique not only
of conservative "fundamentalism," but also of liberal "perfectionism."',0
My liberal Constitution-perfecting theory certainly is a form of
perfectionism. And so, presumably, his criticisms are aimed at theories like
mine.
Third, notwithstanding the association of "Constitution in exile" with
conservative constitutional theory, Sunstein and I are proponents of
progressive and liberal conceptions of the Constitution that are very much
in exile at the present time.II Many conservatives have argued that the real
Constitution has been in exile since the New Deal and that it is time to
restore it.12 Sunstein squarely takes aim at such conservative views. 13 At
the same time, Sotirios A. Barber has defended a largely forgotten
understanding of the Constitution (advanced by James Madison and
Abraham Lincoln) as a charter of positive benefits under which government
has affirmative duties to pursue the well-being of all the people. 14 And
Lawrence G. Sager has argued that the Constitution imposes affirmative
obligations that are judicially underenforced but nonetheless binding
outside the courts on legislatures and executives. 15 I endorse such a view. 16
5. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 37-60.
6. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning].
7. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, One Case at a Time].
8. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy (1996).
9. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 141-71.
10. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 31-41.
11. I am indebted to Mark Graber for emphasizing this point.
12. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of
Liberty (2004); Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 7. But
see Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitution in Exile, 75
Fordham L. Rev. 669 (2006) (distinguishing between "restoring the lost Constitution" of
1789 and restoring the Constitution that supposedly has been in exile since 1937).
13. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 1-19.
14. Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Constitution 1-22 (2003).
15. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional
Practice 95-102 (2004).
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Sunstein, in The Partial Constitution17 and especially in The Second Bill of
Rights,18 has advanced a similar view. Our books together implicitly pose
the question: What are the merits of and prospects for these competing
conservative and liberal or progressive accounts of "Constitutions in exile"?
In this essay, I am going to focus on the second point, minimalism versus
perfectionism. First, I take up perfectionism: What is perfectionism?
What are Sunstein's critiques of it? Do those critiques apply to my
Constitution-perfecting theory? What responses can I offer in defending
my theory? Second, in particular, what are Sunstein's criticisms of liberal
perfectionist justifications for the right of privacy? What responses can I
give to those criticisms? Third, I turn to minimalism: What is minimalism?
Is it just a theory of judicial review (or judicial strategy), or does it amount
to a theory of the Constitution itself? Is minimalism a theory for all times
and circumstances or only for circumstances of moral disagreement and
political conflict? Is minimalism itself a form of perfectionism? Finally, I
examine the journey from Sunstein's The Partial Constitution to his
minimal Constitution: herein of the incredible shrinking constitutional
theory to which I refer in my title.
I. PERFECTIONISM
A. What Is Perfectionism?
I want to distinguish eight (!) varieties of perfectionist constitutional
theory. Doing so will sharpen our understanding of my project and refine
our assessment of Sunstein's critique of perfectionism.
First, there is perfectionism in political philosophy as it might be applied
to constitutional theory. Sunstein states that "[t]he perfectionist approach to
constitutional law should not be confused with perfectionism in political
philosophy," citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism.19 Rawls distinguishes
between political liberalism and perfectionist liberalism (as well as
perfectionist political philosophies more generally): Perfectionists of all
stripes believe that statecraft is soulcraft, and that the state must inculcate
civic virtues or even moral excellence in the citizenry. Despite Sunstein's
remark, we should acknowledge the variety of constitutional perfectionism
that brings perfectionist political philosophy to bear on constitutional
theory. The best example is the work of my frequent coauthor Sotirios A.
Barber, such as in his book, Welfare and the Constitution,20 and his book in
16. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 70-71, 195, 205-09, 214-15.
17. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 138-41, 148-49.
18. Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR's Unfinished Revolution and
Why We Need It More than Ever 139-47, 209-34 (2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, Second Bill
of Rights].
19. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 254 n.9 (citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism
(1993)).
20. See Barber, supra note 14, at 53-64, 118-42.
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progress, Constitutional Failure.2' In Barber's view, we ultimately must
face up to the challenge of "supplying ... the defect of better motives," not
just by relying upon checks and balances and making "[a]mbition...
counteract ambition"-Madison's strategy in The Federalist No. 51 22-but
also by inculcating civic virtues that are necessary for responsible
citizenship and for the success of the constitutional order.
Second, there is also perfectionism in the sense of John Hart Ely's
"process-perfecting" theory of reinforcing representative democracy.
Sunstein refers to this version as "democratic perfectionis[m]." 23
According to Ely's theory in Democracy and Distrust, the Constitution's
core commitment is to representative democracy, and judicial review is
justified principally when the processes of representative democracy, and
thus the political decisions resulting from them, are undeserving of trust.24
Ely argues that courts should reinforce or perfect the procedural
preconditions for the trustworthiness of the outcomes of the political
processes. In my book, I argue that Sunstein's theory in The Partial
Constitution has close affinities to Ely's theory-affinities Sunstein
acknowledges 5-and I interpret his theory in that work as a process-
perfecting theory of securing deliberative democracy. 26 In Radicals in
Robes, any such affinities are faint. Still, his critique of perfectionism is
virtually silent with respect to democratic perfectionism. That is not his
primary target.
Third, I distinguish perfectionism in the sense of my substantive
Constitution-perfecting theory of securing constitutional democracy. 27 I
criticize process-perfecting theories like Ely's and Sunstein's for rejecting
certain substantive liberties (such as privacy or autonomy) as anomalous in
our constitutional scheme. I aspire to do for "substance" what Ely has done
for "process." That is, I develop a substantive Constitution-perfecting
theory-a theory that would reinforce not only the procedural liberties
(those related to deliberative democracy), but also the substantive liberties
(those related to deliberative autonomy) embodied in our Constitution and
presupposed by our constitutional democracy. My Constitution-perfecting
theory is a theory of constitutional democracy and trustworthiness, an
alternative to Ely's theory of representative democracy and distrust (and to
Sunstein's theory of deliberative democracy and impartiality). To be
trustworthy, a constitutional democracy must secure and respect not only
the procedural preconditions for deliberative democracy, but also the
substantive preconditions for deliberative autonomy. Put another way, we
21. See Sotirios A. Barber, Constitutional Failure (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author).
22. The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
23. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 38, 254 n.14 (citing Ely, Democracy and
Distrust, supra note 4).
24. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note 4, at 73-104.
25. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 143-44.
26. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 37-60.
27. Id. at 4-6, 73-74, 210-11.
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need to secure or perfect both the substantive and the procedural
preconditions for the outcomes of the political processes in our
constitutional democracy to be trustworthy.
Sunstein refers to theories like Ronald Dworkin's (and, by implication,
mine) as "rights perfectionis[m]." 28 Despite the differences between Ely's
and my varieties of perfectionism, they share the view that the Constitution
should be interpreted as embodying a scheme of basic liberties that are
preconditions for the trustworthiness of the outcomes of the political
processes. Both Ely and I also argue that judicial review is justified to
secure these preconditions. Our perfectionist theories differ in their
conceptions of the form of government that the Constitution establishes:
representative democracy versus constitutional democracy. 29 Accordingly,
these theories differ in their conceptions of the basic liberties that are the
preconditions for trustworthiness. But they are similar in that both argue
for perfecting the Constitution as they conceive it. Although Sunstein
mentions both of these types of perfectionism, he does not squarely engage
with their common, core claim: that they propose to perfect the
Constitution and the form of democracy it embodies on their own terms and
thus that they are not ultimately "undemocratic" in a way that is
unjustifiable.
Fourth, I also distinguish perfectionism in the sense of a theory of
constitutional interpretation entailing that we should interpret the
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.30 On this view, as Sunstein
puts it, constitutional interpretation is a matter of putting the existing legal
materials "in their best constructive light," or of making them "the best they
can be." 31 Furthermore, constitutional interpretation is the quest for the
interpretation that provides the best fit with and justification of the
constitutional document and underlying constitutional order.32 This sense
of perfectionism-which we might call "interpretive perfectionism"-is
famously associated with Dworkin, and Sunstein mentions Dworkin as a
proponent of it.33 I embrace this sense. 34 In Radicals in Robes, Sunstein
does not fully engage with interpretive perfectionism (though he briefly
mocks it35). In his essay for the Symposium, Sunstein accepts a more
28. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 39.
29. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 10, 77, 79-81, 234 n.43.
30. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 32; see Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 16,
211,225.
31. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 32 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 229
(1986)).
32. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 5, 24, 63, 84; see Dworkin, supra note 31, at
239; Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2867, 2869-70,
2872-74 (2007) [hereinafter Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism].
33. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 32.
34. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 5, 24, 63, 84.
35. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 38.
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generic form of such a perfectionism, which he calls "second-order
perfectionism." 36
Fifth, there is perfectionism in Henry P. Monaghan's well-known sense
of theories of "Our Perfect Constitution": constitutional theories that entail
that the Constitution, properly interpreted, requires the results that the
theorist's normative political theory recommends. 37 Note that the political
theory could be liberal or conservative, progressive or libertarian. Sunstein
does not name this type of perfectionism, but he clearly criticizes
constitutional perfectionism in this sense. In fact, it seems to be his primary
target. Most of his criticisms are not directed at process-perfecting,
Constitution-perfecting, or interpretive perfectionist theories like Ely's,
mine, or Dworkin's as such; rather, Sunstein primarily takes aim at liberals
who argue as if they believe that the Constitution protects whatever rights
normative liberal political theory and a perfect liberal Constitution would
protect. Perfectionism in Monaghan's sense is more morally ambitious than
interpretive perfectionism, and is less constrained by the requirements of fit
and justification.38 Also, unlike Ely's and my forms of perfectionism, it
does not strive rigorously to articulate any sense in which a given basic
liberty is a precondition for the trustworthiness of the outcomes of the
political processes. That Sunstein mainly targets perfectionism in
Monaghan's sense is confirmed by the fact that when he criticizes "false
fundamentalists" for really being conservative constitutional perfectionists
in disguise, he takes them to task for arguing as if they believe that the
Constitution perfectly embodies the current political program of the
extreme conservative wing of the Republican Party. 39
Sixth, there is also perfectionism in the sense of what I will call "taking
rights seriously" liberalism. This form of perfectionism is not so much a
conception of the content of constitutional rights as a conception of their
stringency. These so-called "perfectionists" demand that we must take
rights seriously in all circumstances, including war and crisis, though the
heavens (or at least the republic) may fall. They are liberal rights
absolutists like David Cole, whom Sunstein calls the "Liberty
Perfectionists" as against the "National Security Fundamentalists. '40 These
"perfectionists" are not perfectionists in any of the foregoing senses (except
possibly Monaghan's sense). And the perfectionists in the foregoing senses
36. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2870.
37. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981).
38. See Abner S. Greene, The Fit Dimension, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2921, 2921, 2941
(2007) (distinguishing "aspirationalist perfectionism," which "pays virtually no attention to
fit and focuses almost entirely on justification," from a "coherentist" perfectionism).
39. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 34, 37-38, 217-18, 244, 252. I take some
comfort in Bill Treanor's statements that my theory, perfectionist though it may be, is closer
to "a true originalist approach" than is the "fundamentalist-originalist approach" that Treanor
and Sunstein criticize. See William Michael Treanor, Process Theory, Majoritarianism and
the Original Understanding, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2989, 2994 (2007).
40. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 151-52, 260 n.2 (citing David Cole as a "Liberty
Perfectionist").
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are not necessarily perfectionists in this sense. Dworkin is not a
perfectionist in this sense, even though he wrote the famous book with the
title "Taking Rights Seriously," 41 the term I have appropriated to label these
folks. I certainly am not (see my Chapter 9 on securing constitutional
democracy in circumstances of war and crisis). 42 We might better conceive
these folks, not as perfectionists, but simply as rights-absolutist liberals, for
example, of the ACLU or Center for Constitutional Rights varieties. These
liberals are strongly anti-pragmatic, strongly opposed to balancing rights
against other considerations like national security, deeply distrustful of
government, and strongly protective of individual rights, come what may.
We can also imagine "taking rights seriously" conservatives (most likely
libertarians). 43
Seventh, a still more inchoate sense of "perfectionism" criticized by
Sunstein is simply whatever views mainstream liberal constitutional
scholars typically hold. For example, in the chapter on "Guns, God, and
More," the "perfectionists" Sunstein speaks of embrace the state militia
(rather than individual rights) reading of the Second Amendment right to
bear arms, and the "political safeguards of federalism" argument against the
need for aggressive judicial enforcement of federalism.44 For the latter, he
cites Herbert Wechsler and Jesse Choper.45 Sunstein calls these positions
"perfectionist," but he does not articulate what is perfectionist about them.
There is nothing recognizably perfectionist in any of the foregoing senses
about these positions. They seem to be nothing other than positions that
mainstream liberal constitutional scholars have taken. As I see it, Sunstein
labels these positions as "perfectionist" simply because he is using them as
liberal foils against which to present his minimalism: Everywhere else,
liberal calls for aggressive judicial protection of rights are foils for his
minimalism, while here liberal calls for judicial deference to the political
processes are his foils!
Finally, we might distinguish a highly generic form of "perfectionism":
the idea that every theory is ultimately perfectionist in the sense that its
proponents think that adoption and application of the theory will improve
the constitutional order, even make the Constitution the best it can be in a
general sense. Here I allude to Sunstein's statements to the effect that the
battle among competing constitutional theories must be fought on
perfectionist ground in one sense: Theorists must show that adoption and
application of their theory will improve the constitutional system as a
whole. 46  He confirms and sharpens this sense in his essay for this
41. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
42. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 195-209.
43. The Cato Institute offers illustrations. See, e.g., Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184);
Cato Inst., Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 108th Congress,
chs. 12, 13, 19 (2003), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/handbook I08.html.
44. See Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 222, 237.
45. Id. at 267 n.25.
46. Id. at41.
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Symposium, where he defends "second-order perfectionism." 47 The upshot
of this is that we can see that Sunstein is criticizing perfectionism of many
shapes and sizes; fundamentalists, too, might observe that he is discussing
fundamentalisms of many varieties. Some of Sunstein's criticisms may
apply forcefully to some versions of perfectionism but not as well or not at
all to others.
B. What Are Sunstein's Criticisms of Perfectionism?
What are Sunstein's criticisms of perfectionism, and are they well taken
against my Constitution-perfecting theory? I shall distill his many
criticisms of perfectionism into six somewhat interrelated objections. One,
perfectionism is undemocratic. 48 But, as Sunstein himself has argued,
democracy is not a self-defining idea, and judicial review protecting rights
may well be "counter-majoritarian" (in the sense that it is contrary to what
current majorities want) without necessarily being contrary to our form of
constitutional self-government (i.e., not for that reason undemocratic in an
unjustifiable way).49 For example, we can distinguish (and Sunstein does
distinguish) at least the following four conceptions of democracy (I will just
use shorthand labels here): (1) majoritarian democracy, as illustrated by
James Bradley Thayer and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (also Judge
Learned Hand, whom Sunstein repeatedly invokes concerning the spirit of
liberty); 50  (2) representative democracy, as represented by Ely's
Democracy and Distrust;51 (3) deliberative democracy, as illustrated by
Sunstein's The Partial Constitution;52 and (4) constitutional democracy, as
illustrated by Rawls's, Dworkin's, and my work. 53 Under the last three of
these conceptions, judicial protection of rights that are preconditions for
democracy is "counter-majoritarian" but is not contrary to our
Constitution's form of democracy rightly understood.
To decide whether a theory or practice is problematically undemocratic,
we need to decide what conception of democracy best fits and justifies our
Constitution and underlying constitutional order. In The Partial
Constitution, Sunstein clearly recognizes this important point. 54 But in
Radicals in Robes, he seems to work from a less rigorous conception of
what it means to be objectionably undemocratic. In my book, I argue at
length that my conception of constitutional democracy, which comprehends
basic liberties that are preconditions for both deliberative democracy and
47. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2870.
48. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 35, 39, 51, 247, 251.
49. See Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 103-07, 125, 134, 143, 163.
50. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 35, 44-50 (discussing the views of Thayer and
Holmes as "majoritarians").
51. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note 4, at 77-88.
52. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 133-41.
53. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution
17-26, 32 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Freedom's Law]; Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at
61-83; John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement § 44 (2001).
54. See Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 143-44.
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deliberative autonomy, better fits and justifies our constitutional document
and underlying constitutional order than does Ely's conception of
representative democracy or Sunstein's conception of deliberative
democracy (to say nothing of conceptions of majoritarian democracy). 55 To
make the case that my Constitution-perfecting theory of securing
constitutional democracy is problematically undemocratic, one has to show
that it does not well fit and justify our constitutional document and
underlying constitutional order.
Two, perfectionism is not well suited to circumstances of moral
disagreement and political conflict about basic liberties.56 In Chapter 7, I
respond to Sunstein's and Sandel's diametrically opposed republican
challenges to liberal theories like Rawls's, Dworkin's, and mine. 57 I argue
that Sandel's civic republicanism-which calls for substantive moral
arguments about the goods furthered by protecting constitutional freedoms
instead of autonomy arguments alone-is too thick. Sandel's theory
requires deeper agreement on goods or virtues than seems feasible, given
the fact of reasonable moral pluralism, without intolerable state oppression.
Conversely, I argue that Sunstein's minimalism-which calls for avoiding
substantive moral arguments about goods as well as autonomy arguments-
is too thin. In the face of such pluralism, it settles for shallower agreement
than is necessary to secure constitutional freedoms. I make a Goldilocks
argument: that Sandel's and Sunstein's diametrically opposed challenges
and shortcomings unwittingly show that a liberal republican theory like
mine, with affinities to Rawls's political liberalism, is just right for
circumstances of reasonable moral pluralism. I will not reiterate those
arguments here. 58
Three, perfectionism is highly indeterminate and has made a "mess" of
constitutional law, for example, with respect to the right of privacy. 59 I will
make three responses and say more in the next section on the right to
privacy in particular. First, in my book, I argue that due process
jurisprudence is not as unruly as its critics allege. I argue that the leading
decisions under the Due Process Clause-as represented on a list of
"unenumerated" fundamental rights-can be justified on the ground of a
criterion of significance for deliberative autonomy. I show the coherence
and structure of the cases protecting the rights on that list, carrying forward
the "unfinished business of Charles Black": constructing a structure of
fundamental rights integral to free and equal citizenship.60
55. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 29-35, 43-51, 80-83.
56. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 6, at 3-7, 46-48; Sunstein, One Case at a
Time, supra note 7, at 5, 50-5 1; Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 35, 100-01, 129.
57. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 141-71.
58. I would note, however, that my conception of "deliberative autonomy" is thinner
than the kind of conception of autonomy that Jae Lee seems to contemplate bringing to bear
on criminal law. See Youngjae Lee, Valuing Autonomy, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2973 (2007).
59. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 88.
60. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 89-98. Charles Kelbley expresses a similar view
that the cases protecting a right of privacy or autonomy are not the "mess" that Sunstein
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Second, even if we concede that the Supreme Court's decisions in the
area of substantive due process are a mess, they are no greater a mess than
the decisions in areas like equal protection and the First Amendment.
Welcome to the law. Let us begin with the First Amendment. Many First
Amendment absolutists see the First Amendment frameworks and doctrines
as a mess-they see the categories of unprotected expression as making a
mess of our system of well-nigh absolutist freedom of expression. 61
Sunstein, however, justifies a two-track framework for the First
Amendment that stringently protects speech that is significant for
deliberative democracy, and less stringently protects speech that is
relatively insignificant for deliberative democracy (speech within the
categories of unprotected expression). 62  I argue that substantive due
process jurisprudence has an analogous, but inverted structure; I argue that
a criterion of significance for deliberative autonomy can account for and
make sense of the categories of protected decisions under the Due Process
Clause, just as a criterion of significance for deliberative democracy can
account for and make sense of the categories of unprotected expression
under the First Amendment. I develop homologies between the structures
of deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy, and between
substantive due process jurisprudence and First Amendment jurisprudence;
they are mirror images of one another with regard to judgments of
significance for deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy,
respectively. The point is that we have been making judgments about the
significance of asserted basic liberties all along, and that doing so in both
contexts is more structured than is commonly appreciated. 63
Third, I want to note some unacknowledged similarities between due
process and equal protection. Sunstein sympathetically quotes Justice
Antonin Scalia's statement to the effect that the Due Process Clause is the
due process of law clause (and it says nothing about the substance of the
laws much less about the liberty that is due), 64 as in "nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
whatever the law is." Sunstein, like Scalia, presents this as an incubus on
the back of substantive due process and the right of privacy or autonomy.65
But one can make an analogous argument about the Equal Protection
presents them as being. See Charles A. Kelbley, Privacy, Minimalism, and Perfectionism, 75
Fordham L. Rev. 2951, 2961-65 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove the
Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make it Particularly
Urgent for the Supreme Court to Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech
and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81
Iowa L. Rev. 883 (1996).
62. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 121-29 (1'993);
Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 232-56.
63. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 127-32.
64. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 81 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
592 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); id. at 86-88.
65. Id. at 86-88; Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2876-77.
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Clause: that it is the equalprotection of the laws clause (and it says nothing
about the substance of the laws that are to be applied equally to everyone),
as in "nor shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, whatever the laws are." Of course, the Supreme
Court has rejected the "equal protection of the laws, whatever the laws are"
reading, in favor of the view that the Equal Protection Clause embodies a
principle of equality. 66 But the Court also has rejected the "due process of
law, whatever the law is" reading, in favor of the view that the Due Process
Clause embodies a principle of liberty.67 (As the authors of the joint
opinion put it in Casey, the "controlling word" in the Clause is "liberty.") 68
My point is that we should no more credit Sunstein's and Scalia's
arguments about the Due Process Clause than we should credit the
analogous argument about the Equal Protection Clause.
Similarly, Sunstein, like Scalia, thinks it practically dispositive to object
that the right of privacy or autonomy is not "enumerated" in the text of the
Due Process Clause. 69 But neither is the right of interracial marriage
"enumerated" in the text of the Equal Protection Clause. Nor is an anti-
caste or anti-subordination principle of equality listed in that text. Nor is
the right to protection against discrimination on the basis of gender. Come
to think of it, the right to abortion is no more "enumerated" in the Equal
Protection Clause than in the Due Process Clause. Sunstein accepts the
protection of these rights under the Equal Protection Clause even though
they are not enumerated in that text. The point is that we need theories of
''equal protection" to make decisions about the contents of the Equal
Protection Clause-and its contents are not "enumerated" in the text of the
Constitution-just as we need theories of "liberty" to make judgments
about the contents of the Due Process Clause. Thus, the fact that the
contents of the Due Process Clause are not "enumerated" in the text of the
Constitution is not a dispositive objection (any more than it is for the Equal
Protection Clause). An analogous argument applies to the First
Amendment's protection of "freedom of speech," as Dworkin has lucidly
shown: The right to bum flags is no more "enumerated" in the text of the
First Amendment than is the right to abortion "enumerated" in the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. 70  The objection to
protecting the right to privacy on the ground that it is "unenumerated" is
66. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (rejecting the "equal application" theory of
Equal Protection Clause expressed in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)).
67. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (rejecting the
interpretation of the Due Process Clause as "govem[ing] only the procedures by which a
State may deprive persons of liberty").
68. Id.
69. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 86; Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra
note 32, at 2880.
70. Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and
Individual Freedom 127, 131 (1993) [hereinafter Dworkin, Life's Dominion].
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"bogus" and "spurious," as Dworkin and Charles Black have shown.71 In
my book, as well as here, I have built upon their arguments. 72
Four, perfectionists would interpret the Constitution to protect "off the
wall" rights (my term, not Sunstein's), rights that have no basis in the text,
history, or structure of the Constitution. Sunstein says that liberal
perfectionists argue that the Constitution protects rights like the right to
prostitution. 73  I would expect caricatures of liberal perfectionism
concerning the right of privacy from Scalia, but not from Sunstein.
Sunstein states that Scalia's arguments in dissent in Lawrence v. Texas-
that the Court's protection of the right of homosexuals to intimate
association puts us on a slippery slope to "the end of all morals
legislation"-are "wildly overstated. '74  But he ends up making similar
arguments when he ridicules liberal "perfectionists" concerning where they
will draw the line concerning liberty and privacy. He imputes to liberal
perfectionists the view that the Constitution enacts John Stuart Mill's On
Liberty, in particular, its "harm principle." 75 As I acknowledge in my book,
there may have been liberals who held that view in the 1970s. 76 But I have
not seen anyone argue for anything resembling that view in recent years-
not even those who interpreted Lawrence as Justice Anthony Kennedy's
"libertarian revolution" took that view. 77 The libertarianism that people
like Randy Barnett saw in Kennedy's opinion was more, well, libertarian.
In my book, I specifically distinguish my idea of deliberative autonomy
from Mill's harm principle. 78 The greatest perfectionists of our time have
not made the arguments that Sunstein attributes to perfectionism here. Can
you imagine Dworkin or Laurence Tribe arguing that the Constitution
protects a right to prostitution? No responsible liberal perfectionist-
indeed, no responsible liberal defender of the right to privacy or
autonomy-argues for these rights with which Sunstein (somewhat like
Scalia) mocks due process and liberal perfectionism.
What is more, Sunstein takes an uncharacteristic cheap shot at liberal
perfectionists. He says that liberal perfectionists have argued that the
Constitution protects welfare rights, seemingly implying that this view is
beyond the pale. 79 Yet he surely knows, for example, that the most
prominent perfectionist, Dworkin, has argued that the Constitution does not
71. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 53, at 72, 76-81; Dworkin, Life's Dominion,
supra note 70, at 129-31, 143-44; Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the
Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1103, 1108-11 (1986).
72. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 90-91, 105-06.
73. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 82.
74. Id. at 96 (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
75. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 89.
76. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 132-34.
77. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v.
Texas, 2002-2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21.
78. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 132-34.
79. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 33.
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protect welfare rights. 80 And let us not forget that Sunstein himself has
argued that the Constitution does secure welfare rights, or freedom from
desperate conditions, or even a second Bill of Rights. Sunstein, though,
argues that such rights are to be judicially underenforced and left for their
fuller enforcement through legislatures in the Constitution outside the
courts. 81  This is essentially the position taken by well-known liberal
proponents of constitutional welfare rights such as Lawrence Sager and
Frank Michelman. 82 It is also the position I take in my book. 83
Below I take up the fifth and sixth objections: (5) Perfectionism harbors
hollow hopes that courts can bring about liberal social change and ignores
risks of unintended consequences and backlash; 84 and (6) perfectionism
does not appreciate the limited institutional capacities of courts.85
II. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Next, I am going to look more particularly at Sunstein's specific
criticisms of Supreme Court decisions relating to the right of privacy. I will
not reiterate the arguments I make in Chapter 7 of my book concerning
Sunstein's proposed minimalist justifications for Griswold v. Connecticut
and Lawrence v. Texas (on grounds of desuetude) and Roe v. Wade
(recognizing a right to abortion only in cases of rape and incest). Instead, I
am going to focus on Sunstein's discussion of the roots of (or precedents
for) the right to privacy. I will address his parallel refrain--"It all began
with"-with respect to Roe, Lochner, and Dred Scott.
A. Roe v. Wade
"It all began, of course, with Roe v. Wade."'86 To read Sunstein's critique
of Roe, you would think three things: (1) that Roe was a triumph of liberal
perfectionist arguments and that no one has ever offered "conservative"
justifications for this 7-2 Burger Court decision on grounds of consensus
and common law constitutionalism; (2) that Roe's justification of the right
to abortion is all there is, and that the Supreme Court itself has never
offered a fuller, more persuasive justification of the right; and (3) that
Sunstein has fully accepted controversial arguments about Roe most
commonly associated with Mary Ann Glendon, for example, that Roe short-
circuited the political processes that were proceeding state-by-state toward
liberalization of restrictive abortion laws, thus provoking backlash against
80. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 53, at 36.
81. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 138-40, 148-49; Sunstein, Second Bill of Rights,
supra note 18, at 139-47, 209-34.
82. Sager, supra note 15, at 95-102; Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a
Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 659, 684-85.
83. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 70-71, 214-15.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 177-87.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 188-99.
86. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 82-83, 104-05 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
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the right to abortion.87 I will take up the first and second points here; I will
discuss the third below in connection with backlash. 88
Before we accept an account of Roe as a product of liberal perfectionism,
we should recall Thomas C. Grey's classic account of Roe (in Eros,
Civilization and the Burger Court) as reflecting not liberal concerns for
autonomy and the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, but
conservative concerns for family stability and family planning.89 Grey's
account helps make sense of the fact that it was, after all, the conservative
Burger Court (not the liberal Warren Court) that decided Roe and that four
of the justices in the 7-2 majority were moderate Republicans (Harry
Blackmun, Warren Burger, Lewis Powell, and Potter Stewart, including
three out of the four Republican Justices appointed by Richard Nixon). The
sole Nixon appointee to dissent was William Rehnquist. I guess these
moderate, mostly midwestern Republicans (soon joined by that Illinois
Republican John Paul Stevens) just did not see the radical counter-
revolutionary Republicans90 (and the culture war) coming.
One could even see Blackmun's opinion in Roe91 as minimalist: an
incompletely theorized agreement, and shallow rather than deep.
Blackmun, rather than articulating a deep justification for the right to
abortion on liberal perfectionist grounds of liberty or autonomy, simply
sketched the "roots" of the right in decisions from Meyer v. Nebraska
(1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) up through Griswold v.
Connecticut (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972).92 Nor did he articulate
a deep justification for the right in a liberal or feminist perfectionist ground
of an anti-caste or anti-subordination principle of sex equality. 93 What is
more, Blackmun offered an incompletely theorized agreement in the sense
that he acknowledged that the right could be grounded in "the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action"
or "in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people. ' 94 He
wrote an opinion with which six other Justices, perhaps for their own
deeper reasons, could agree. With this incompletely theorized agreement
on hand, Blackmun concluded that the right "is broad enough to encompass
87. Id. at 104-05, 248-49, 268 n.4 (citing Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in
Western Law (1987)).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 177-87.
89. Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 83 (1980).
90. Below I distinguish between "preservative conservatives" and "counter-
revolutionary conservatives." See infra text accompanying notes 138-40.
91. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. Id. at 152-53 (citing, among others, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce
v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
93. Blackmun subsequently came to accept the gender equality ground for the right to
abortion as well as the liberty or privacy ground. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926-29 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
94. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 95 Granted,
Sunstein may say that the "broad enough" is the problem from the
standpoint of minimalism. My point is that Blackmun's opinion is hardly
the opinion that a liberal perfectionist would have written.
Before accepting the view of Roe as reflecting liberal perfectionism, we
should also recall that many have justified Roe as a consensualist decision
or a common law constitutionalist decision as distinguished from a
perfectionist decision. Many originally justified Roe on grounds of
consensus.96 Given all the controversy that subsequently has surrounded
Roe, it is easy to forget this. Many have justified it as solidly grounded in
common law constitutionalism. They say that the critics are missing the
forest for the trees and the like.97 Despite all the controversy surrounding
Roe, that is the way Sandra Day O'Connor, Kennedy, and David Souter
evidently still see the right to abortion, after all these years, as indicated by
their joint opinion in Casey.98 Let us not forget that Justice John Marshall
Harlan II is often celebrated as a great common law constitutionalist, and
that the joint opinion in Casey embraced his conception of the framework
for the due process inquiry.99 Sunstein praises O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter for their minimalism in certain cases.100 Souter clearly conceives of
himself as the new Harlan in certain respects, most notably, in his common
law constitutionalist conception of the due process inquiry (see not only the
joint opinion in Casey but also his concurrence in Washington v.
GlucksberglOl).
In any case, the Supreme Court's justification of the right to abortion in
Roe was not the Court's last word on the subject. It offered a fuller and
more persuasive justification for the right in Casey. That justification,
again, is in the form of a Harlan-style common law constitutionalism: It
builds upon precedents, conceives of liberty as a "rational continuum"
rather than an enumerated list, conceives judgment as a "rational process"
or "reasoned judgment" rather than mechanical application of a bright-line
formula, and conceives tradition as a "living thing" rather than a hidebound
historical practice. 10 2 As I argue in my book, the joint opinion in Casey
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The
Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 689 (1976); Harry H.
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221 (1973).
97. Philip B. Heymann and Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v.
Wade and its Critics, 53 B.U. L. Rev. 765 (1973).
98. 505 U.S. at 846-53, 857-59 (joint opinion).
99. Id. at 848-50 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
100. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 29-30, 44, 146, 245 (praising O'Connor); id. at
31, 245 (praising Kennedy); id. at 188-90 (praising Souter).
101. 521 U.S. 702, 756 n.4, 763-73 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
102. Casey, 505 U.S. at 848-50 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542, 543 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
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intertwines arguments sounding in deliberative autonomy with arguments
sounding in an anti-subordination principle of sex equality. 103
B. Lochner v. New York
Actually, "[i]t began... with Lochner v. New York." 104 Yet in The
Partial Constitution and in "Lochner's Legacy," Sunstein develops an
insightful and important interpretation of what is wrong with Lochner, one
that differentiates it from Roe and the right to privacy. 105 Sunstein contends
that what is wrong with Lochner is not, as Ely thought, that the Court gave
heightened judicial protection to "unenumerated" substantive fundamental
values. 10 6 Rather, it is the Court's use of status quo neutrality and existing
distributions as the baseline from which to distinguish unconstitutionally
partisan political decisions from impartial ones.1 07  Ironically, the
implication of this interpretation is that certain contemporary Justices, such
as Scalia, who protest most adamantly against Lochnering (as protecting
substantive fundamental rights) in fact engage most actively in it (as
treating status quo neutrality as a baseline for constitutional
interpretation). 108 For Ely, Roe is an incarnation of Lochner because it
involves judicial protection of a substantive fundamental right drawn from
the nether world beyond his Carolene Products jurisprudence. 10 9 For
Sunstein, by contrast, at least in The Partial Constitution and "Lochner's
Legacy," Roe is unrelated to Lochner because it does not evince status quo
neutrality." 0 Sunstein, like Ely, rejects substantive due process arguments
for a right to abortion, whether rooted in privacy, decisional autonomy, or
bodily integrity. But Sunstein, unlike Ely, argues for a right to abortion
grounded in equal protection and an anti-caste principle, contending that
abortion restrictions turn a morally irrelevant characteristic, sex (like race),
into a systemic source of social disadvantage."I' On his view, restrictive
abortion laws are invalid because they are "an impermissibly selective co-
optation of women's bodies" and they "turn women's reproductive
capacities into something for the use and control of others.""12 Sunstein
defends Roe and Casey as necessary to secure equal citizenship for women,
103. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 94-95.
104. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 84 (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905)).
105. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 45-62; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legacy].
106. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wol. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale
L.J. 920 (1973).
107. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 45-62, 259-61; Sunstein, Legacy, supra note 105,
at 874-75, 882-83.
108. See Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 68-92; Sunstein, Legacy, supra note 105, at
874-75, 883-902.
109. Ely, supra note 106, at 933-45.
110. See Sunstein, Legacy, supra note 105, at 874-75; Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at
259-61.
111. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 259.
112. Id. at 272.
2900 [Vol. 75
THE SHRINKING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
indeed as tantamount to a Brown v. Board of Education for women, 113 not
analogous to Lochner (or, worse yet, Dred Scott v. Sandford 14).
We are left with a puzzle: Why would Sunstein go to all the trouble to
establish (pace Ely and Scalia) that what is wrong with Lochner is not
substantive due process but status quo neutrality, and that Roe is analogous
to Brown, not to Lochner and Dred Scott, yet now say (with Ely and Scalia)
that Lochner and Dred Scott are precedents for Roe?l" 5  The Partial
Constitution expresses the better view on these matters. The right of
privacy did not begin in Lochner (or in Dred Scott). We turn now to Dred
Scott itself.
C. Dred Scott v. Sandford
"[Dred Scott] really is where it all began." 1 6  Dred Scott is an
emblematic, defining case. 117 Proponents of liberal theories of protecting
substantive fundamental rights typically contend that Dred Scott shows the
perils of originalism, that is, approaching constitutional interpretation as if
its basic goal were to divine what the founding generation intended or
understood the document's words to mean. 18 Advocates of originalism, by
contrast, commonly claim that Dred Scott illustrates the dangers of
protecting "unenumerated" substantive fundamental rights under the Due
Process Clauses. 119 Justice Scalia and others condemn Roe (and Casey) as
"the Dred Scott of our time." 120 What do people mean when they draw this
analogy? I note three possibilities. One, in both Roe and Dred Scott, the
Supreme Court had the hubris to presume to resolve a divisive national
controversy, and the results were disastrous. 121 Two, they draw an analogy
between laws that deny the undeniable personhood of slaves and laws that
113. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
115. It bears noting that Ely's famous critique of Roe in The Wages of Crying Wolf was
not his last word on the subject. After the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe in Casey, Ely
wrote a "fan letter" to the three Justices who wrote the joint opinion in that case. Ely praised
their opinion as "excellent": "not only reaching what seem to me entirely sensible results,
but defending the refusal to overrule Roe v. Wade splendidly." Ely added, "'Roe has
contributed greatly to the more general move toward equality for women, which seems to me
not only good but also in line with the central themes of our Constitution." John Hart Ely,
On Constitutional Ground 305 (1996).
116. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 86 (discussing Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393).
117. Cf Sunstein, Legacy, supra note 105, at 873 (discussing Lochner and Brown as
examples of "defining cases").
118. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 Const.
Comment. 37 (1993).
119. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 28-
34, 43 (1990).
120. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Richard John Neuhaus, The Dred
Scott of Our Time, Wall St. J., July 2, 1992, at A8.
121. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 998-1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); Neuhaus, supra note 120.
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(they claim) deny the undeniable personhood of fetuses. 122 Three, in both
cases, they claim, the Court protected "unenumerated" substantive
fundamental rights under the word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause.
Indeed, Dred Scott, they say, gave birth to substantive due process. 123
Sunstein implicitly endorses this third point in Radicals in Robes when he
says Dred Scott "really is where [the right of privacy protected in Roe] all
began." (He also may implicitly endorse the first point.)
But is this third point a sound interpretation of Dred Scott? No. The
Court instead protected the enumerated, "plain words" right of slaveholders
to own "property in a slave."' 124 Substantive due process is deriving
"unenumerated" rights from the word "liberty," not protecting property
rights protected in the plain words of the text. It is important to appreciate
that Chief Justice Roger Taney was emphatic that it "could hardly be
dignified with the name of due process of law" to deny these rights to
"property" that are "distinctly and expressly affirmed" in "plain words" in
the text of the Constitution.125
D. The Restoration of the "Constitution in Exile, "the Banishment of the
Right of Privacy
Have we been playing Hamlet without the Prince? The title of Sunstein's
book is Radicals in Robes: Why Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for
America. It is largely a critique of radical conservative "fundamentalism"
and an argument that restoring the fundamentalists' "Constitution in exile"
would be disastrous for the country. Yet I have said hardly a word about
Sunstein's arguments concerning fundamentalism. I will close this section
with a word about Sunstein's critique of the right to privacy in relation to
fundamentalists' calls for abolishing it.
Sunstein paints a vivid picture of what our constitutional world might
look like if the fundamentalists gained a controlling majority on the
Supreme Court and implemented the constitutional theory that they
profess. 126 He gives powerful and apt examples of radical changes that we
might see. This picture should be frightening not only to progressives and
liberals but also to moderates (and indeed to what I will call preservative
conservatives as distinguished from counter-revolutionary
conservatives127). I relish the fact that the example with which he opens his
scary tale is a fundamentalist court repudiating the right to privacy,
specifically Griswold and Roe. 128 After all, these are decisions that he
122. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 Neb. L.
Rev. 668 (1984).
123. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 998 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Bork, supra note 119, at 28-34, 43.
124. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450-52 (1857).
125. Id.
126. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 1-19.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 138-40.
128. See Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 1.
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severely criticizes for their liberal perfectionism. He does not mention that
on his preferred minimalist ground for justifying Griswold--desuetude 129 -
any state legislature may revoke the right to use contraceptives if a majority
of the legislature has the political will to do so. Nor does he mention that
on his preferred minimalist ground for deciding Roe-recognizing the right
to abortion only in cases of rape or incest 130-any state legislature could
ban ninety-nine percent of abortions if it had the political will to do so. I
am not suggesting that minimalism is as scary as fundamentalism, just that
these examples should help bring out why many liberals are afraid that
Sunstein's minimalism does not adequately secure fundamental rights.
III. MINIMALISM
As stated above, I devote half of Chapter 7 of my book to criticizing
Sunstein's minimalism, in particular, his minimalist approach to the cases
protecting the right to privacy or autonomy. 131 My critique focused on his
arguments in his previous books, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict
and One Case at a Time. I shall not repeat that critique as it would apply to
Radicals in Robes. I should say, however, that it seems to apply a fortiori
to this book, for Sunstein's minimalism now seems even more minimal.
Here I shall raise some questions about minimalism: What is the theory
of minimalism? Is it merely a theory of judicial review (or judicial
strategy) that is agnostic concerning the character and commitments of the
Constitution? Or does it amount to a theory of the Constitution itself?. Is
minimalism a theory for all times and circumstances or only for certain
times and circumstances? Is minimalism itself a form of perfectionism?
A. The Circumstances for Minimalism
Officially, Sunstein presents minimalism as a theory of judicial review
(or judicial strategy), not as a theory of the Constitution itself. Moreover,
he argues for minimalism as a theory that is appropriate in certain
circumstances, for example, those of moral disagreement and political
conflict about our basic liberties. 132 He concedes that perfectionism might
be appropriate in other circumstances, mentioning Chief Justice John
Marshall's "nation-building perfectionis[m]" in the "young United States"
as well as the situation of South Africa in "building a new constitutional
tradition in the aftermath of apartheid."' 133 I would grant that minimalism is
more appropriate in circumstances like the present than in certain other
circumstances. Here I draw upon my recent analysis of the question
129. Id. at 97-99.
130. Id. at 107.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
132. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 27-30, 247.
133. Id. at 34-35.
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whether we are entering, in terms of the title of a conference we held at
Fordham, "A New Constitutional Order?"' 34
In The New Constitutional Order, Mark Tushnet argues that what
Sunstein calls judicial minimalism is the jurisprudence of the new
constitutional order. 135 He argues that the Rehnquist Court's constitutional
jurisprudence amounted to a chastening of constitutional aspirations rather
than a launching of a conservative revolution or counter-revolution. Indeed,
it seems that minimalism would be appropriate for a constitutional
jurisprudence that aims to chasten constitutional aspirations rather than to
usher in a constitutional counter-revolution. But let us ponder the question
of to whom minimalism would appeal. In what follows, I suggest doubts
about whether minimalism is a positive jurisprudential program for a new
constitutional order as opposed to a method of damage control, from both
liberal and conservative perspectives, during a period of transition from one
order to another.
One, it is understandable that minimalism would appeal to liberals and
progressives like Sunstein during a period of transition from a moderately
liberal court to a conservative court (and beyond that, to a genuinely new
constitutional order where conservative aspirations literally hold court).
After all, minimalism might serve as a jurisprudence of damage control for
liberals and progressives during such a period: For we inevitably are going
to face conservative judges and conservative decisions, but minimalism
promises to moderate and minimize the damage wrought by them. 136
Two, it is understandable that minimalism would appeal to pragmatic,
Clinton Democrats like Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
during such a period. Their judicial temperaments and substantive
constitutional sensibilities incline them to embrace minimalism. 137
Three, it is also understandable that minimalism would hold some appeal
for preservative conservatives like O'Connor, (sometimes) Kennedy, and
Souter, as distinguished from counter-revolutionary conservatives like
Scalia, Thomas, and (sometimes) Rehnquist (and now perhaps Samuel Alito
and John Roberts). I am using a distinction between two types of
conservatives-preservative conservatives and counter-revolutionary
conservatives--corresponding to two senses of conservative in common
parlance. 38  Preservative conservatives, for the most part, preserve
precedents rather than overruling them--even if, as an original matter, they
might have decided the cases differently-though they may well take a
"this far and no further" approach to precedents, draining them of
134. James E. Fleming, The New Constitutional Order and the Heartening of
Conservative Constitutional Aspirations, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 537 (2006).
135. Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order 130-38 (2003).
136. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 57.
137. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution
(2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185 (1992).
138. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 117.
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generative vitality. 139 Counter-revolutionary conservatives, on the other
hand, believe that a liberal revolution has occurred (here, the "Warren Court
revolution"), and that it is their responsibility to bring about a conservative
counter-revolution, and that they must purge the law of precedents
manifesting liberal error at the earliest available opportunity. If they do not
have the votes to overrule these precedents, they seek to reinterpret them so
as to extirpate any generative force from them. To see the difference
between preservative conservatives and counter-revolutionary
conservatives, look at the clash between the joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter in Casey, on the one hand, and the dissents of Scalia
and Rehnquist in the same case, on the other, respectively.' 40 Rehnquist's
counter-revolutionary conservatism was moderated somewhat by the fact
that he was Chief Justice. Minimalism may especially appeal to
preservative conservatives in a time of 5-4 votes. (Obviously, "counter-
revolutionary conservative" is my term for the people Sunstein calls
"radicals in robes" and fundamentalists.)
Four, it is even understandable that minimalism would appeal in some
cases to conservative Chief Justices like Rehnquist and Roberts during such
a period of transition. After all, in some cases they may not have the votes
to overrule precedents manifesting liberal error, or to reject altogether
certain "liberal" arguments. And so, in these cases, it may suit their
purposes to vote with the "liberal" majority, to assign the opinion to
themselves, and to issue a minimalist decision that controls the damage
from their conservative perspectives. But I do not see minimalism holding
much, if any, appeal for conservatives if they muster the votes, through new
appointments, to move beyond a transition period of chastening liberal and
progressive constitutional aspirations to a period of consolidating a
conservative revolution or counter-revolution. (Nor would minimalism
hold much appeal for liberals if they were to gain a majority on the
Supreme Court.)
Yet there are indications in Sunstein's work that minimalism in fact turns
out to be a theory of judicial review for all times and circumstances. To the
extent that Sunstein's minimalism is rooted in a pragmatic or Burkean
distrust of abstract theories and principles,' 4' it may be a theory for all
times and circumstances. To the extent that it reflects a Learned Hand-like
humility and skepticism about moral principles-witness Sunstein's
pervasive refrain that "the spirit of liberty is that spirit which is not too sure
that it is right"14 2-it likewise may be a theory for all circumstances. Note
that this idea applies not only to judges, but also to citizens. Similarly, to
139. Tushnet, supra note 135, at 67; James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the
Specter ofLochner, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 147, 152 (1999).
140. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
141. See Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 12; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism,
105 Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism].
142. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 35, 129 (quoting Learned Hand, The Spirit of
Liberty 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1953)).
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the extent that minimalism grows out of concern for the limited institutional
capacities of courts, 143 it may be a theory for all circumstances (unless
courts somehow change and become more capable of making the kinds of
judgments that those who are preoccupied with limited institutional
capacities of courts think they are not capable of making, which is
unlikely). And, to the extent that it is rooted in a conception of common
law constitutionalism, understood in a minimalist way, it may be a theory
for all circumstances. I say "understood in a minimalist way" because we
might understand common law constitutionalism to be more ambitious
theoretically than is minimalism. 144  This is exemplified in the
jurisprudence of Justice Harlan, for example, in his dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, which was embraced by the joint opinion in Casey.145 Finally,
though Sunstein says minimalism is appropriate in circumstances of moral
disagreement and political conflict, he probably would add that these are
perennial circumstances in a constitutional order like our own. He might
well invoke Rawls's characterization of the fact of reasonable moral
pluralism as a permanent feature of a constitutional democracy such as our
own, not to be regretted and not soon to pass away.' 46
B. Minimalism Itself as a Form of Perfectionism
Sunstein's "minimalism" is best understood in terms of what motivates
it: the concern that "theoretically ambitious" federal judges are removing
too many issues (for example, abortion and sexual orientation) from the
purview of elected legislatures and therewith popular choice.1 47
Perfectionist theories of constitutional interpretation like Dworkin's and
mine, he says, invite theoretically ambitious decisions (like Roe v. Wade
and Lawrence v. Texas) that rob popular majorities of the opportunity to
deliberate about, and through deliberation to reach consensus about,
divisive moral issues. Sunstein proposes "minimalism," therefore: "the
view that judges should take narrow, theoretically unambitious steps" in
deciding constitutional questions. 148
I will attempt a clearer picture of minimalism momentarily, but I note
first something that is not always clear in Sunstein's argument: His
position on interpretation is a two-part affair. Only one of these parts
143. Id. at 35, 127; Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2867-70; see
infra text accompanying notes 188-99.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
145. 505 U.S. at 848-50 (discussing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 543 (1967)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). For an analysis of more and less theoretically ambitious
conceptions of common law constitutionalism, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Neither
Minimalism nor Perfectionism: Reflections on Sunstein's and Fleming's Efforts to Find the
Sweet Spot in Constitutional Theory, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2997 (2007).
146. Rawls, supra note 19, at 36-37, 136, 144.
147. See Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2876. In this section, I
draw upon Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic
Questions 140-44 (2007).
148. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2868.
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proposes anything fairly described as "minimalist." The minimalist part,
moreover, does not deal with constitutional interpretation; it does not
advise interpreters how to find what the Constitution means. The
minimalist part is rather a theory of judicial strategy. Its explicit audience
is judges. Sunstein says his "focus ... is constitutional interpretation by the
judiciary."' 149 While he advises judges to adopt minimalism, he leaves
"citizens and their representatives" free to adopt what he calls a "first-order
perfectionism"' 50-- which he attributes to Dworkin and me. Instead of
advising judges and other interpreters how to find what the Constitution
means, minimalism tells judges what to do after they have decided that
question. In other words, minimalism tells judges the kind of thing they
should say to the public in constitutional cases, not how to decide what the
Constitution means.
Sunstein, however, does have a theory of how to decide what the
Constitution means. That theory comprises the second part of his position.
But this second part is not minimalist; it is in fact a version of
perfectionism, as we shall see. Unraveling and then recombining the two
parts of Sunstein's position leaves us with the following advice to judges:
(1) Find what the Constitution means essentially as Dworkin does, (2) then
tell the people what is best for them to hear. Sunstein's position raises
many issues about the role of judges and the nature of constitutional
democracy, especially the theory of responsibility in constitutional
democracy. 151 But my present interest in his position is limited. I seek to
show only that (1) his approach to constitutional interpretation is
philosophic or perfectionist in nature, and (2) his "minimalism" is a theory
of what judges should do or say to the public after they have decided what
the Constitution means.
That Sunstein's approach to constitutional interpretation is philosophic or
perfectionist in nature is indicated in a preliminary way by his choice of
labels. He calls Dworkin's approach (and my Constitution-perfecting
theory) "first-order perfectionism" and minimalism "second-order
perfectionism," which is enough to suggest that minimalism is some
diminished form of a philosophic approach or perfectionism. Looking
behind these labels to what they stand for, we see that Sunstein
distinguishes four strategies of judicial conduct in constitutional cases. The
first strategy (associated with Thayer) is that judges should let legislation
stand unless legislation "is plainly in violation of the Constitution"-i.e., a
"clear mistake" in violation beyond reasonable question. The second
(associated with Raoul Berger and other originalists) is that judges should
ground their judgments in "the original public meaning of the
[constitutional] document." The third strategy (Sunstein's approach) is
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id.
151. Sotirios Barber and I explore these issues in Barber & Fleming, supra note 147, at
52-55.
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minimalism, in which judges should "build modestly on their own
precedents" instead of ruling "broadly or ambitiously." And the fourth
strategy (associated with Dworkin) is that judges should represent the
Constitution as the best it can be, "and in that sense perfect[] it."'1 52 None
of these strategies is "ruled off the table by the Constitution itself," Sunstein
says, and therefore each "must be defended by reference to some account
that is supplied by the interpreter."' 153 These accounts, moreover, must be
"perfectionist" in nature-that is, moral or philosophic.
Sunstein is clear and emphatic about this last point. I quote him in full:
Any approach to the founding document must be perfectionist in the sense
that it attempts to make the document as good as it can possibly be.
Thayerism is a form of perfectionism; it claims to improve the
constitutional order. Originalism, read most sympathetically, is a form of
perfectionism; it suggests that constitutional democracy, properly
understood, is best constructed through originalism. Minimalism is a
form of perfectionism too; it rejects Thayerism and originalism on the
ground that they would make the constitutional system much worse. It
would appear that the debate among Thayerians, originalists, minimalists,
and perfectionists must be waged on the perfectionists' own turf. And if
this is so, perfectionists are right to insist that any approach to the
Constitution must attempt to fit and to justify it. Perhaps the alternatives
to perfectionism are all, in one or another sense, perfectionist too. 154
This is an important passage. For here, Sunstein recognizes that a
philosophic argument is needed to defend any general approach to
constitutional meaning and/or judicial strategy. Here Sunstein says
something about his activity as a constitutional theorist. He has to offer a
philosophic argument for minimalism, just as other theorists have to offer
philosophic arguments for their positions. But this proves nothing about the
activity of judges deciding concrete constitutional questions. Armed with
Sunstein's philosophic argument for minimalism (whatever it may be), can
judges (or any other interpreters) utilize the tenets of minimalism to decide
concrete constitutional questions in a manner free of controversial
philosophic choices? To see why the answer is no, I shall consider
Sunstein's further observations about minimalism.
Sunstein says that "[n]o approach to constitutional interpretation makes
sense in every possible world," and that the case for each approach "must
depend, in part, on a set of judgments about institutional capacities.' 55
Thus, where "democratic processes work exceedingly fairly and well" on
their own-where there is no racial segregation, for example, and "political
speech is not banned," and "federalism and separation of powers are
safeguarded, and precisely to the right extent," all without "judicial
intervention"--then it "would make a great deal of sense" for judges to
152. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2868.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 3; see also Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 41.
155. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2867.
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adopt Thayer's approach to constitutional adjudication. On the other hand,
when representative institutions are behaving badly and "the original public
meaning is quite excellent" from the standpoint of honoring constitutional
rights and institutions, then an originalist approach "would seem best."
Where original meanings are inadequate and courts are more competent,
morally and intellectually, than representative institutions, Dworkin's
approach is best. And minimalism is best when original meaning "is not so
excellent" for protecting rights and institutions, "the democratic process is
good but not great," and "judges will do poorly if they strike out on their
own, but very well if they build modestly on their own precedents."'156
From this it appears that before a judge can decide to go minimalist, she
must decide (1) the best view of constitutional rights and/or institutions; (2)
whether the original meaning comports with the best view of
rights/institutions; (3) how well present democratic processes are
progressing toward the best view of rights/institutions; and (4) whether
judges are presently likely to do a better job than the democratic processes
in serving the best view of rights/institutions. The complexity and
theoretical ambition of these moral and nonmoral judgments require no
elaboration. They are at least as ambitious as anything Dworkin has ever
attempted. The minimalist judge may pretend otherwise to the public. She
may say, for example, that a particular prosecution of homosexual intimate
conduct is unconstitutional simply because prosecutions under the relevant
statute are too rare for the public to know what to expect, and that knowing
what to expect is a hallmark of the rule of law. But what she says to the
public is one thing, and what she is thinking to herself is another. What she
is thinking is that public opinion on homosexuality is heading in the right
direction without her help, and that she risks mucking things up if she
boldly steps ahead of public opinion and flatly declares a constitutional
right of homosexuals to intimate association. If there is minimalism here, it
is not in how the judge understands the Constitution, it is in how she
presents herself to the public as a matter of judicial strategy.
In closing my assessment of minimalism, I want to recapitulate two main
points. One, Sunstein has come out as a perfectionist: He acknowledges
that his theory of minimalism, like every theory, claims to fit and justify the
Constitution and to make it the best it can be. Two, Sunstein's "minimalist"
judgments about cases protecting the right to privacy or autonomy (which I
assess more fully in Chapter 7 of my book) are no less "theoretically
ambitious" than are my "perfectionist" analyses grounded in autonomy, just
as his theory of deliberative democracy is no less "theoretically ambitious"
than is my theory of constitutional democracy. In sum, there is nothing
minimalist about the theoretical and strategic judgments called for by
Sunstein's minimalism.
156. Id. at 1-3.
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IV. FROM THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION TO THE MINIMAL CONSTITUTION:
THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
You may have seen (or heard of) the cult science fiction film, The
Incredible Shrinking Man (or its take-off, The Incredible Shrinking
Woman). 157 I hope Cass will not be offended if I suggest that the odyssey
of his theory from The Partial Constitution to the minimal Constitution in
Radicals in Robes is that of an incredible shrinking constitutional theory. I
assume he will not be since he names the fictional society for which his
theory is appropriate "Smallville."' 158
A. Thinning Deliberative Democracy Down
Sunstein's theory has shrunk from a theory of perfecting deliberative
democracy--or judicial reinforcement of the preconditions for its
legitimacy-to a theory of largely permitting the political processes to
proceed, such as they are (or largely judicial deference to the representative
processes, such as they are). Ironically, as stated above, I was drawn to
engage with Sunstein's The Partial Constitution in the first place because of
its evident perfectionism: It was a process-perfecting theory to beat Ely's
analogous theory. 159 Sunstein criticized Ely's theory for not adequately
developing a substantive theory of democracy that courts were to reinforce.
He criticized Ely's interest-group pluralist conception of representative
democracy and offered instead a liberal republican conception of
deliberative democracy. Yet Sunstein agreed with Ely that the structure of
a theory should be process-perfecting: it should secure the preconditions
for democracy. 160 I criticized Sunstein's theory for being, even then,
merely a theory of "the partial Constitution" as distinguished from the
whole Constitution: it emphasized the preconditions for deliberative
democracy to the neglect of those for deliberative autonomy. Thus, it fell
short of a full Constitution-perfecting theory.161
The Partial Constitution provides Sunstein's fullest exposition of a
substantive vision of the Constitution as embodying a deliberative
democracy. There he develops a substantive theory of the Constitution and
the form of government that it embodies, as well as a theory of judicial
review. His theory of judicial review would secure the preconditions for
deliberative democracy though it would leave fuller realization of some of
those preconditions to legislatures and executives in the Constitution
outside the courts.
Since then, Sunstein has focused on developing a theory of judicial
review (or judicial strategy) over and against a theory of the Constitution,
157. The Incredible Shrinking Man (Universal Studios 1957); The Incredible Shrinking
Woman (Universal Pictures 1981).
158. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2868.
159. See supra text accompanying note 5.
160. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 104-05, 142-44.
161. Fleming, Securing, supra note 1, at 59-60.
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that is, on the role of courts more than on the commitments of the
Constitution itself. In his subsequent work, we see less and less elaboration
of the substantive commitments of our Constitution and underlying
constitutional scheme, conceived as a deliberative democracy. We see
more and more elaboration of the problems with judicial review-the
limited institutional capacities of courts, the circumstances of moral
disagreement and political conflict, the brakes that social resistance,
unintended consequences, and backlash put upon courts bringing about
liberal social change, and the like.
Worse yet, we see an erosion or narrowing of Sunstein's commitments to
deliberation and agreement. Deliberation, once the heart and soul of his
conception of deliberative democracy, is now worrisome: It leads not to
reasonable agreement but to polarization. 162 And agreement itself shrinks
from a regulative ideal to be sought through deliberation to shallow,
narrow, minimal agreements that "leave things undecided": We should
seek, at most, "incompletely theorized agreements."'163
What is more, his once rich conception of deliberative democracy has
withered away into a minimal conception of democracy that is practically
majoritarianism. In The Partial Constitution, Sunstein argued for
deliberative democracy over and against interest-group pluralist
conceptions of representative democracy like Ely's and majoritarian
conceptions of democracy like Holmes's. 164 He also criticized Ely for
apparently thinking that democracy was self-defining rather than arguing
for one conception over other available conceptions. 165 Yet in Radicals in
Robes, we see Sunstein talking, against perfectionists, almost as if
democracy were self-defining-and as if judicial review that is "counter-
majoritarian" were, for that reason, objectionably undemocratic.' 66 To be
sure, he still distinguishes minimalism from majoritarianism. 167 My point
is that the gap between these two conceptions has shrunk considerably in
Radicals in Robes as compared with the huge gulf between deliberative
democracy and majoritarian democracy in The Partial Constitution.
162. Compare Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 133-45, 162-94, with Sunstein, Radicals,
supra note 2, at 167-69, 173, and Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 111-44
(2003).
163. Compare Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 137, with Sunstein, Legal Reasoning,
supra note 6, at 4-5, 35-61, and Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 27-29.
164. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 104-05, 14344 (criticizing Ely's interest-group
pluralist conception of representative democracy); id. at 124-27 (criticizing Holmes's
majoritarian conception of democracy).
165. Id. at 104-07, 143.
166. See Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 35, 39, 51; see also supra text accompanying
notes 48-55.
167. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 44, 50-51, 251.
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B. From Theory of Judicial Review (or Judicial Strategy) to Theory of the
Constitution Itself
Furthermore, it appears that Sunstein's constitutional aspirations and
commitments have atrophied (or at least been "chastened") as minimalism
has expanded from being a theory of judicial review (or judicial strategy) to
practically being a theory of the Constitution itself. In The Partial
Constitution, the distinction between theory of the Constitution and theory
of judicial review was clear, and it was clear that Sunstein had a progressive
substantive vision of the Constitution. Yet, because of concerns about the
institutional limits of courts, he argued that some provisions of the
Constitution should be judicially underenforced, and should be more fully
enforced by legislatures and executives as part of the Constitution outside
the courts. 168 In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict and One Case at a
Time, Sunstein developed minimalism as a theory of judicial review (or
judicial strategy). It was theoretically possible to hold a perfectionist theory
of the Constitution (like mine) while holding a minimalist theory of judicial
review. Sunstein acknowledges this possibility in his piece for our
Symposium. 169 For example, a perfectionist might believe that the best
strategy for realizing our constitutional commitments in certain
circumstances is minimalist judicial review. Recall my analysis above of
minimalism as damage control during a transition from a moderately liberal
or conservative constitutional order to a (possibly) counter-revolutionary
one. 170
But in Radicals in Robes, the distinction between a theory of the
Constitution and a theory of judicial review (or judicial strategy) becomes
blurred. You may say, well, this is understandable or excusable in a book
published by a trade press and written for a more general audience than just
specialists in constitutional theory. To the contrary, this is the audience for
whom this distinction matters most, if we really do believe in taking the
Constitution seriously outside the courts-that is, if we really do believe
that the people themselves have obligations conscientiously to reflect upon
the meaning of our constitutional commitments rather than viewing
constitutional interpretation as the exclusive province of the courts.
Instead, the Constitution outside the courts evidently has withered away.
The book does not seem to conceive the people themselves as reflecting
conscientiously upon the meaning of our constitutional commitments. It
appears that courts should leave things undecided simply to enable the
people to decide divisive moral issues as they wish, leaving the Constitution
aside. 171
168. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 133-49.
169. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2869.
170. See supra text accompanying note 136.
171. See Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 126-29; Sunstein, Second-Order
Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2870.
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Indeed, we should ask whether Radicals in Robes expresses or
presupposes a minimalist conception of the Constitution itself. What might
one think if one held a minimalist view of the Constitution itself?. One
might think that the commitments of the Constitution are relatively thin and
themselves leave most questions concerning their meaning and application
undecided. And one might think that the Constitution simply says nothing
about many or most things. 172 And one might think, as Holmes famously
put it in his dissent in Lochner, that a constitution "'is made for people of
fundamentally differing views."' 173  And one might think, as Hand
famously put it, that "'the spirit of liberty is ... not too sure that it is
right,"' whether about the obligations of justice or the commitments of the
Constitution. 174 And one might be skeptical or distrustful of abstract moral
principles generally, fearing that such principles are divisive and
polarizing.175 Finally, one might think that "ought implies can," that courts
have limited institutional capacities to interpret a Constitution any thicker
or more ambitious than the foregoing propositions entail' 76 and, therefore,
that we ought to conceive of the Constitution itself as being thin enough and
modest enough for their limited institutional capacities to be adequate to
interpret and apply it. Here we can see a downsizing, recasting, or
retrofitting of the Constitution itself to fit a conception of limited judicial
capacities. Sound familiar? All of these ideas are expressed in one form or
another in Radicals in Robes. To the extent they are, perhaps that work
does indeed express or presuppose a minimalist view of the Constitution
itself.
C. Exaggerated Fears About Backlash and Unintended Consequences
Exaggerated fears about backlash and unintended consequences, too,
have contributed to the minimalization or evisceration of constitutional
commitments. It is striking to what degree Sunstein has incorporated
arguments against hollow hopes that courts can bring about liberal social
change, together with worries about backlash and unintended consequences,
into his minimalism. I grant that as early as The Partial Constitution,
Sunstein had endorsed Gerald Rosenberg's famous hollow hopes
argument. 177 Just as we should not harbor hollow hopes that courts can
bring about liberal social change, so, too, we should not have exaggerated
fears that courts will provoke backlash, cause unintended consequences,
172. See Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 86.
173. Id. at 47 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
174. Id. at 35 (quoting Hand, supra note 142, at 190).
175. See id. at 12.
176. See id. at 127; Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2867-70,
2878-80.
177. Sunstein, Partial, supra note 3, at 375 n.42 (stating that he drew "heavily [on Gerald
N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991)] for the
discussion of Brown and Roe").
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and make things worse when they protect controversial constitutional
rights. Sunstein seems to endorse the familiar arguments about Roe
provoking backlash, spawning the right to life movement and the like
(citing Glendon, for example).178 The causes of the emergence of the right
to life movement are numerous, and most of them have nothing to do with
judicial decisions-and certainly nothing to do with how broadly or
narrowly, deeply or shallowly, judicial opinions are written. The revival of
religious fundamentalism generally would have occurred with or without
Roe. The right to life movement would have been born with or without
Roe. More generally, the "new right," neoliberalism, and
neoconservatism-countless varieties of "antiliberalism" (to use the term
Stephen Holmes has used)179-would have emerged with or without Roe.
The "women's movement" and gains in women's equality and reproductive
freedom would have provoked backlash with or without Roe. Gains in
women's equality and reproductive freedom, whether furthered through
legislation or judicial decision, and whether through federal courts or state
legislatures, would have provoked backlash. See the forceful discussion in
Susan Faludi's Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American
Women. 180
Similarly, if the Supreme Court had never decided Brown v. Board of
Education,181 and Congress nonetheless had passed the very civil rights
laws that it in fact enacted, we still would have experienced resistance to
and backlash against gains in equality and civil rights for African
Americans. I mention this particular example because Sunstein sometimes
writes as if there is something inherent in equality that makes it less
adventuresome or less intrusive on the political processes than liberty or
privacy (and correspondingly less likely to provoke backlash). To take
another example, the Supreme Court, after Shapiro v. Thompson, 182 never
recognized a constitutional right to welfare,' 83 and gains in the "war on
poverty" mostly were pursued through the legislative processes.
Nonetheless, we still have experienced backlash against welfare programs,
including the "war against the poor" and "welfare reform."'184
All of these developments-the right to life movement, resistance to
gains in women's equality and reproductive freedom, resistance to gains of
the civil rights movement (culminating in resistance to affirmative action
programs), welfare reform, and the like-are part of a larger backlash
against the 1960s and its aftermath. Liberal developments in the 1960s and
178. Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at 104-05, 248-49, 268 n.4 (citing Glendon, supra
note 87).
179. Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (1993).
180. Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women (1992).
181. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
182. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
183. The most important case in which the Court declined to recognize a right to welfare
is Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
184. See, e.g., Herbert J. Gans, The War Against the Poor: The Underclass and
Antipoverty Policy (1995).
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1970s provoked all manner of antiliberalism, and backlash against liberal
gains, however advanced, whether through courts or legislatures, courts
together with legislatures, federal or state governments (and, I should add,
whether through maximalist or minimalist judicial decisions). To take a
hypothetical, does anyone seriously believe that if the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court had never decided Goodridge,185 and if instead the
Massachusetts legislature on its own initiative had passed a law recognizing
same-sex marriage in November 2003, the repercussions for the 2004
elections would have been significantly different? Granted, the attack
would not have been on activist liberal judges, but on liberal legislatures,
but there would have been similar repercussions. To offer another
hypothetical, no one should believe for one second that people like Glendon
would have complained about the Supreme Court deciding the matter of
abortion for the whole country in one bold stroke in Roe if the Court had
reached the opposite result and interrupted the state-by-state democratic
processes by holding that fetuses are full persons who are entitled to life
and to equal protection along with born persons. 186 When courts make
liberal decisions, they become an easy target for antiliberals' attacks, but we
should not let that fool us into thinking that the primary objection is to
courts attempting change rather than to liberal change as such. Law
professors, because they are excessively court-centered, are especially
vulnerable to falling into this way of thinking.
There is a huge measure of what Albert Hirschman famously called the
"rhetoric of reaction"'187 in these tales of court decisions like Roe leading to
unanticipated consequences and provoking backlash, even to the point of
making things worse. Those who oppose liberal change make gloomy
predictions and warnings about unintended consequences and backlash.
Again, they warn about liberal change through whatever venue: not just
courts but also legislatures and executives, not just the federal government
but also state governments. On top of these warnings, they pile the
argument that liberal do-gooders always make things worse, not only for
the world but even (perhaps especially) for the people they seek to help and
for themselves. This kind of thinking is especially rampant among law and
economics scholars and those who work in their shadow. In this sense,
economics indeed proves to be the "dismal science."
It is important to understand that these "rhetoric of reaction" moves are
not simply reactionary; people who make these moves affirmatively aim to
demoralize those who push for liberal change. I fear that Sunstein has been
more affected by these ideas than is warranted. Perhaps this should come
as no surprise given that he teaches at University of Chicago, surely the
185. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
186. See Glendon, supra note 87.
187. Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy
(1991).
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stronghold of "rhetoric of reaction" ideas. Come to think of it, Gerald
Rosenberg of hollow hopes fame also teaches at University of Chicago.
D. Preoccupation with the Limited Institutional Capacities of Courts
The final aspect of the downsizing of Sunstein's constitutional theory
that I want to mention is his increasing preoccupation with the limited
institutional capacities of courts. This preoccupation, too, seems to be an
occupational hazard at Chicago (although Sunstein's former Chicago
colleague and sometime coauthor Adrian Vermeule-whose trademark is
emphasis on limited institutional capacities' 88-has now moved to
Harvard). Sunstein has a revealing footnote in his essay for the Symposium
in which he says basically that he is not repudiating his arguments in The
Partial Constitution, but that perhaps the discussion there would have been
better if he had grappled more fully with the limited institutional capacities
of courts.1 89
Sunstein offers a number of prudential reasons concerning the likelihood
that courts will get things wrong and the lack of any special qualities
making judges better suited than citizens or legislatures to resolve moral
conflicts. Thus, judicial minimalism is appropriate given the relative
institutional capacities of courts as compared with politically elected
officials. 190  There are two opposed traditions in constitutional theory
concerning the relative institutional capacities or positions of courts and
legislatures. On one account, courts' independence from politics is their
greatest weakness or disqualification for performing a function like
elaborating and protecting substantive constitutional freedoms against
encroachment through the political processes. Sunstein has fully developed
a version of this view. On another account, courts' independence from
politics is their greatest strength or qualification for discharging such a
responsibility. Dworkin has advanced a well-known version of such a
view. 191 It is not possible to resolve the long-standing dispute between
these traditions here. But it is worth recalling Justice Robert Jackson's
formulation in the second flag salute case (invalidating a required salute),
responding to Justice Felix Frankfurter in the first such case (upholding a
required salute): rather than deferring to the "vicissitudes" of the political
processes, courts vindicate constitutional freedoms "not by authority of
[their] competence but by force of [their] commissions." 192  If the
188. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of
Legal Interpretation (2006).
189. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2867 n.1, 2875 n.34
(discussing Vermeule, supra note 188).
190. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 6, at 177; Sunstein, Radicals, supra note 2, at
127.
191. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 33-71 (1985); Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously, supra note 41.
192. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, 640 (1943),
overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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commission of the courts is to preserve the Constitution, including
substantive liberties, against encroachment through the political processes,
they would be abdicating their responsibility were they to side with
Sunstein and against Dworkin on this dispute.
"Ought implies can," and Sunstein and other scholars who are
preoccupied with the limited institutional capacities of courts say that courts
simply are not competent to carry out the commission that Jackson,
Dworkin, and I believe they hold. 193 Such scholars might object that judges
simply are not capable of being Dworkin's "Hercules" or "Platonic
guardians" (to use Hand's term). 194 I wish Dworkin had never used the
alliterative formulation "Hercules"--as in "Hercules" versus "Herbert"
(Lionel Adolphus Hart)-in describing judging under his theory of legal
interpretation as contrasted with judging under H. L. A. Hart's legal
positivism. 195 For Dworkin's formulation makes the responsibilities of
judging seem too Herculean (or Olympian). And that plays into or
exacerbates the worries of those who are preoccupied with the limited
institutional capacities of courts.
In reality, judges throughout American history have shown themselves to
be perfectly capable of making the kinds of judgments that what Dworkin
calls a moral reading of the Constitution, and what Sotirios A. Barber and I
call a philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation, require of them.
In "Hard Cases," Dworkin said his "rights thesis" is "less radical than it
might first have seemed": "The thesis presents, not some novel information
about what judges do, but a new way of describing what we all know they
do."'196 In Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions, Barber and I
defend a philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation that does not
require judges to be philosophers. 197 It requires only that they make
philosophic choices of the sort that they have been making all along, from
John Marshall through Robert Jackson through John Marshall Harlan II
through John Paul Stevens through David Souter. And it presupposes that
they are capable of (and justified in) making these judgments.
I want to venture a hypothesis about the scholars who are preoccupied
with the limited institutional capacities of courts. In the first instance, they
write as if they are primarily skeptical about the institutional capacities of
courts to make the decisions that, for example, perfectionists say courts
have a responsibility to make. They want to leave things to be decided by
the legislatures, and so we presuppose that they have confidence in the
institutional capacities of legislatures. Then it turns out that they are
193. See Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2867-70, 2878-80;
Vermeule, supra note 188.
194. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 41, at 105; Learned Hand, The Bill of
Rights 73 (1972) ("For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.").
195. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 41, at 105-30.
196. Id. at 90.
197. Barber & Fleming, supra note 147, at 155-70.
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skeptical about the institutional capacities of legislatures to make the
decisions that it seems they have a responsibility to make. Wait, it turns out
that executives, too, have limited institutional capacities and are not capable
of making the regulatory and other determinations that we might think they
have a responsibility to make. The upshot is that they say we should leave
decisions to markets instead of governmental regulation. (I grant that
Sunstein does not go all the way with them in the embrace of markets.) 198
Furthermore, it is not as if these scholars are populists who have confidence
in the capacities of the people themselves to make decisions either; they are
greatly skeptical of the people's capacities, too. All of this skepticism
about the institutional capacities of all of these institutions and the people
themselves is based in part on moral skepticism and other forms of
skepticism.
But it is important to see that this skepticism about capacities is driven in
part by exaggerated, too lofty conceptions of what it is that judges,
legislatures, executives, and citizens are said to have responsibilities to do
in the first place. For example, those who are preoccupied with limited
institutional capacities of courts think that, under a moral reading, a
philosophic approach, or a Constitution-perfecting theory, judges must be
Herculean or Platonic philosopher judges who are capable of living on
Olympus. 199 In fact, again, all these approaches require is that judges be
capable of doing what they have been doing all along.
A final word about Chicago and the incredible shrinking constitutional
theory. When Ronald Dworkin gave the keynote address for the Fordham
Symposium on Fidelity in Constitutional Theory a decade ago, he remarked
upon how antitheoretical certain scholars at Chicago had become, alluding
to Posner and Sunstein. He viewed their opposition to theories of the sort
he propounded as rooted in pragmatism.200 I have suggested that some
strains of thinking coming out of Chicago have contributed to the shrinking
of constitutional theory. When I think of Chicago, a city I love, I think of
Carl Sandburg's poems about Chicago.20' Whatever happened to the
"Stormy, husky, brawling, City of the Big Shoulders" of Sandburg's
admiration? Where is that "tall bold slugger set vivid against the little soft
cities"? Certainly not in Smallville. Perhaps, you will say, on Olympus.
But I do not believe that we have to live on Olympus for Dworkin's moral
reading, Barber's and my philosophic approach, and my Constitution-
198. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (1997).
199. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, supra note 32, at 2869.
200. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1265-68 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, The Arduous
Virtue]; see also Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes 57-74 (2006) (criticizing the "Chicago
School" represented by Posner and Sunstein).
201. Carl Sandburg, Chicago Poems (1916). Dworkin also alluded to Sandburg's poems
in suggesting that the empiricist, pragmatic approach championed by Posner and Sunstein
was "very Chicago. Broad-shouldered hog butcher to the world, and all of that." Dworkin,
The Arduous Virtue, supra note 200, at 1265.
[Vol. 752918
THE SHRINKING CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
perfecting theories to be appropriate-just down here in the United States
of America.
CONCLUSION: THE ODYSSEYS OF ALEXANDER BICKEL AND CASS
SUNSTEIN
In 1994, when Cass came to Fordham to give the Robert L. Levine
Lecture, 20 2 a colleague of mine (and Harvard Law School classmate of
Cass), Jim Kainen, said that he viewed Cass's project as trying to work out
a synthesis of the ideas of John Hart Ely and Alexander Bickel. At the
time, I got the Ely part, but not the Bickel part. Then, as Sunstein began to
develop minimalism, I began to see the Bickel part. In Democracy and
Distrust, Ely aptly concludes his critique of theories of "discovering
fundamental values" with a section called "the odyssey of Alexander
Bickel.' '20 3 I want to close by sketching parallels between the odysseys of
Bickel and Sunstein.
Sunstein's The Partial Constitution is the beginning point in the journey,
roughly analogous to Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch.20 4 Here
Sunstein, like Bickel, has confidence in the capacity of courts to discover or
construct substantive principles or theories and to elaborate them. At the
same time, Sunstein like Bickel tempers this confidence with a recognition
of the institutional limits of courts. Gerald Gunther famously quipped that
Bickel had "100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time."20 5  For
Sunstein at that point, I would say the latter percentage was considerably
higher. Though perhaps we should say that Sunstein would have 20%
insistence on principle, 100% of the time!
The middle point of the odyssey for Bickel was The Supreme Court and
the Idea of Progress;20 6 for Sunstein, it is Legal Reasoning and Political
Conflict and One Case at a Time. Bickel became deeply critical of the
Warren Court and what he saw as its blueprint for the future and vision of
the good society, just as Sunstein became critical of perfectionism and
developed minimalism. Bickel became preoccupied with social resistance
to judicially pursued change and with the limited institutional capacities of
courts. Ditto for Sunstein.
The next point for Bickel (and, tragically, his final point) was his
posthumously published The Morality of Consent, with its evident
Burkeanism;20 7 for Sunstein, it may be Radicals in Robes or, more clearly
and tellingly, "Burkean Minimalism." 20 8 Perhaps his next book will be an
202. Cass R. Sunstein, Conflicting Values in Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1661 (1994).
203. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note 4, at 71-72.
204. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics (1962).
205. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1964).
206. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1970).
207. Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (1975).
208. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 141.
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even clearer counterpart to the Burkeanism of Bickel's The Morality of
Consent.2 0
9
209. Indeed, at the Symposium, responding to my suggestion of parallels between
Bickel's thought and his own, Sunstein stated that his next book is on tradition.
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